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CALL ME ISHIMARU: INDEPENDENT 
ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS 
JOHN ARNOLD* 
Abstract: International law does not provide an adequate enforcement mecha-
nism against illegal whaling. The Japanese government claims that its whaling 
practice falls within the scientific research exception of an international morato-
rium on commercial whaling. Despite an International Court of Justice ruling 
finding that its practice does not fall within this exception, Japan has continued to 
kill thousands of whales each year with no effective opposition. The area in 
which this whaling occurs, however, falls outside the jurisdiction of any nation. 
Although the United Nations Security Council has the authority to act, the deli-
cate nature of international diplomacy effectively ties its members’ hands on this 
matter. To fill this void, the International Whaling Commission should amend the 
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling to include a provision al-
lowing for enforcement of the moratorium by approved non-governmental organ-
izations. Should this amendment pass, the needless slaughter of thousands of 
whales each year could be prevented.  
INTRODUCTION 
The battle between whale and man has raged on for millennia.1 Prized as 
sources of food and useful materials whales have been hunted, a process re-
ferred to as whaling, by cultures the world over.2 In the early twentieth centu-
ry, technological innovations such as motorized ships and cannon-fired har-
poons revolutionized the whaling industry, allowing for greater numbers of 
whales to be harvested during a single whaling expedition.3 By the early 
1940s, following decades of high-tech whaling and the taking of tens of thou-
sands of whales per year, the stocks of certain species had plummeted with 
                                                                                                                           
 * Senior Note Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2016–2017.  
 1 Rock Art Hints at Whaling Origins, BBC (Apr. 20, 2004), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/
nature/3638853.stm [https://perma.cc/H9HJ-S4FZ]. 
 2 History of Whaling, WHALE FACTS, http://www.whalefacts.org/history-of-whaling/  [https://
perma.cc/Z5G9-X2XQ]. 
 3 Whales and Hunting, NEW BEDFORD WHALING MUSEUM, http://www.whalingmuseum.org/
learn/research-topics/overview-of-north-american-whaling/whales-hunting [https://perma.cc/U75F-
BAFJ] (noting that historically, whales were used in a variety of products ranging from lamp or lubri-
cating oil made from their blubber, to whalebone corsets). 
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several nearing extinction.4 It is only in the last seventy-five years that there 
have been significant efforts to preserve and protect whales.5 
In response to the noticeable impact of the overuse of whaling, fifteen 
countries convened to create the International Convention for the Regulation 
of Whaling (“ICRW”).6 Following the ICRW’s moratorium on whaling in 
1986, the only two types of whaling permitted today are subsistence and re-
search whaling.7 Subsistence whaling allows indigenous cultures that have 
historically relied on whaling for survival to continue to do so, both for practi-
cal and cultural preservation reasons.8 The other exception, whaling for scien-
tific research, allows for the annual culling of a limited number of whales.9 
The discretion, though, to determine the annual research quota falls upon the 
contracting government and not the ICRW.10 Accordingly, the contracting gov-
ernment must submit its corresponding research to the ICRW annually.11 
This note argues that the ICRW should be amended to allow non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) to enforce its provisions.12 Part I will 
begin with an introduction to the history of Japanese whaling, followed by 
background on Japan’s modern whaling industry.13 Next, Part II will provide a 
brief overview of applicable international and U.S. maritime law relating to 
whaling.14 Part III will cover global enforcement mechanisms of these laws 
and regulations.15 Part IV will document the successes of various NGOs where 
traditional environmental enforcement has failed. In particular, it will explore 
the impact of organizations such as the Center for Human Rights and Envi-
ronment (“CEDHA”) in Uruguay, Ecopravo-Lviv (“EPL”) in Ukraine, the In-
ternational Anti-Poaching Foundation (“IAPF”) in Zimbabwe, and conclude 
with a discussion of The Global Anti-Poaching Act (“GAPA”).16 Finally, Part 
                                                                                                                           
 4 Id. 
 5 History of Whaling, supra note 2. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling, WHALE & DOLPHIN CONSERVATION, http://us.whales.org/
issues/aboriginal-subsistence-whaling  [https://perma.cc/5ABA-CLK4]; History of Whaling, supra 
note 2 (citing examples of cultures that continue to uphold this practice including the Inuit islanders of 
the United States and Canada, as well certain indigenous peoples in Russia and Indonesia). 
 9 History of Whaling, supra note 2. 
 10 See Special Permit Whaling, INT’L WHALING COMM’N, https://iwc.int/permits [https://perma.
cc/6RPM-BGQ6] (noting that the contract government has full discretion over the permitting process 
for scientific research exemption). 
 11 Id. 
 12 See infra notes 190–192 and accompanying text.  
 13 See infra notes 18–37 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 38–69 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 70–130 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 131–189 and accompanying text. 
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V will explore a potential amendment to the ICRW authorizing NGOs the 
power to enforce wildlife protection laws.17 
I. HISTORY OF JAPANESE WHALING 
A. Whaling in Japanese Culture 
The history of Japanese whaling dates back to at least the early eighth 
century.18 In fact, the oldest Japanese book in existence chronicles the con-
sumption of whale meat by the first emperor of Japan.19 Japanese whalers tra-
ditionally employed hand-held harpoons, but over time kept pace with interna-
tional improvements in whaling technology and were able to improve the effi-
cacy of their hunting techniques.20 By 1962, the Japanese whaling industry 
sold more than 226,000 tons of whale meat nationwide.21 Since then, annual 
consumption of whale meat in Japan has declined to just one gram per person, 
with approximately 4000 tons stored by the Institute of Cetacean Research 
(“ICR”).22 In 2012, seventy-five percent of whale meat put up for auction did 
not sell.23 Despite the exceedingly low demand, for whale meat, Japan has con-
tinued to harvest whales for commercial purposes.24  
B. Institute of Cetacean Research 
The ICR is a Japanese organization that specializes in the study of 
whales.25 It was established in 1987, and granted legal status by the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, a department of the Japanese Govern-
ment.26 The asserted purpose of the ICR is to address problems surrounding 
Japanese fisheries, especially those that have arisen from tightening regula-
tions.27 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See infra notes 190–221 and accompanying text. 
 18 See History of Japanese Whaling, FACTS ABOUT JAPAN, http://www.facts-about-japan.com/
whaling-history.html [https://perma.cc/GGJ2-GMWD]. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. (stating that scarcity of food in the wake of World War II and the need for an economical 
source of protein led to a sharp increase in the consumption of Japanese whale meat in the 1950s). 
 22 Rupert Wingfield-Hayes, Japan and the Whale, BBC (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-asia-35397749 [https://perma.cc/7BNZ-EF33]; Whale Meat Back on School Lunch Men-
us, JAPAN TIMES (Sept. 5, 2010), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2010/09/05/national/whale-meat-
back-on-school-lunch-menus/#.WJNApbYrLX- [https://perma.cc/76CQ-4YU8]. 
 23 Justin McCurry, Japan’s Appetite for Whale Meat Wanes, GUARDIAN (June 14, 2012), https://
www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/jun/14/japan-appetite-whale-meat-wanes [https://perma.
cc/2Z4Z-HTVH]. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Overview and Purpose, INST. OF CETACEAN RESEARCH, http://www.icrwhale.org/abouticr.html 
[https://perma.cc/2J4L-5V8W]. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
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The ICR’s fleet consists of at least five Japanese-flagged and Japanese-
owned vessels.28 The largest, the NISSHIN MARU, is a 425-foot long factory 
ship, meaning it can process on-board the whales it catches and therefore take 
bigger hauls before returning to shore.29 The NISSHIN MARU is supported 
directly by smaller vessels, the YUSHIN MARU number one, number two, 
and number three, as well as the SHONAN MARU NO.2.30 
The ICR’s website states that in particular, the organization was estab-
lished in response to the moratorium on commercial whaling that was adopted 
by the International Whaling Commission (“IWC”) in 1982 and the creation of 
the Southern Ocean Whale sanctuary in 1994, amongst a number of other regu-
latory measures affecting the operation of Japanese fisheries.31 The stated pur-
pose of its research is ostensibly to ensure that when commercial whaling is 
resumed, it will be sustainable due to the replenished stock.32 
One of the main research programs of the ICR is Japan’s Research Whal-
ing in the Antarctic (“JARPA”).33 The first stage of JARPA ran from 1987 to 
2005, and was described as a long-term study on sustainable management of 
whale stocks.34 Beginning in 2005, the Japanese Whale Research Program un-
der Special Permit in the Antarctic (“JARPA II”) expanded this study to a 
greater number of whale species, seeking to determine whale population num-
bers and dynamics, overall species health, and the impact of whaling on ma-
rine ecosystems.35 The ICR states that in order to obtain accurate data, the 
sample size of whales tested through lethal means must be as high as it is.36 
Despite rolling out in 2005, the “Research Results” web page for JARPA II, 
the page only states the objectives of the program, not any actual results.37 
                                                                                                                           
 28 Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y (Sea Shepherd I), 860 F. Supp. 
2d 1216, 1222 (W.D. Wash. 2012), rev’d, 708 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2013), amended and superseded by 
725 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 29 Id.; Andrew Darby, New Rules for Safe Shipping May Save Whales, SYDNEY MORNING HER-
ALD (July 18, 2009), http://www.smh.com.au/environment/whale-watch/new-rules-for-safe-shipping-
may-save-whales-20090717-do9b.html [https://perma.cc/52NA-F67N]. 
 30 Sea Shepherd I, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 1222. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Questions & Answers: Japan’s Research Whaling in the Antarctic, INST. OF CETACEAN RE-
SEARCH, http://www.icrwhale.org/QandA1.html#a1 [https://perma.cc/TGM6-LL3W]. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id.; Scientific Contribution, INST. OF CETACEAN RESEARCH, http://www.icrwhale.org/sc
JARPA.html [https://perma.cc/9SL6-BBNM] (noting in particular the effects of contaminants). 
 36 Questions & Answers, supra note 32; see Whaling in Japan, WHALE & DOLPHIN CONSERVA-
TION, http://us.whales.org/issues/whaling-in-japan [https://perma.cc/8VFM-R5RX] (observing that in 
the past decade, Japanese whale quotas have surpassed 1200 whales annually). 
 37 See Research Results, INST. OF CETACEAN RESEARCH, http://www.icrwhale.org/JARPAResults.
html [https://perma.cc/J4CT-MQQW] (outlining the objectives of ICR research program, Japanese Re-
search Whaling in the Antarctic (“JARPA II”)). 
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II. APPLICABLE MARITIME, INTERNATIONAL, AND U.S. LAW 
A. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 
Drafted in 1946, the International Convention for the Regulation of Whal-
ing (“ICRW”) was convened to create a system that would manage the then-
shrinking whale stocks.38 The ICRW sought to regulate all facets of the whal-
ing industry.39 In particular, the convention was designed to safeguard all 
whale species from the effects of overfishing, and allow for depleted whale 
stocks to recover while mitigating any related economic distress that whaling 
countries could experience.40 Article IX of the ICRW stipulates that each sig-
natory government shall take appropriate measures to ensure enforcement of 
the stated provisions.41 Accordingly, punishments for infractions against the 
provisions of the convention are to be carried out by persons or vessels under 
that government’s jurisdiction.42 
The ICRW also established the International Whaling Commission 
(“IWC”).43 In 1986, the IWC instituted, and has since maintained, a moratori-
um on commercial whaling.44 The moratorium determines a specific catch 
quota for each stock of whale, but these quotas are not binding and only serve 
as recommendations to the member countries.45 
Additionally, Article VIII of the ICRW provides an exception to the mora-
torium, permitting countries to “kill, take and treat” whales for scientific re-
search.46 Rather than setting its own parameters for this exception, the ICRW 
allows each country to set its own quotas.47 Although it does review mandato-
ry submissions from each country outlining the objectives of their research, the 
                                                                                                                           
 38 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 161 
U.N.T.S. 72 [hereinafter ICRW]; see U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL CONVEN-
TION FOR THE REGULATION OF WHALING 5 (2013), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
191051.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FGP-5EH3] (stating that the United States deposited an instrument of 
ratification in 1947, and it went into force in 1948). 
 39 International Whaling Commission, INT’L WHALING COMM’N, https://iwc.int/home [https://
perma.cc/LJ9D-G4D3] [hereinafter The International Whaling Commission] (stating that there are 
now eighty-eight member nations, with Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Ice-
land, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Panama, South Africa, the Soviet Union, the United King-
dom, and the United States comprising the original fifteen). 
 40 ICRW, supra note 38, at art. IX, ¶ 1. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at art. III, ¶ 1. 
 44 The International Whaling Commission, supra note 39. 
 45 William C. Burns, The International Whaling Commission and the Future of Cetaceans: Prob-
lems and Prospects, 8 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 31, 35–44 (1997). 
 46 ICRW, supra note 38, at art. VIII, ¶ 1. 
 47 Id. 
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ICRW can only offer recommendations as to the merits of the research goals, 
and cannot prohibit any goals or methods it finds lacking.48 
Although the drafting of the ICRW was certainly a step in the right direc-
tion, it is unfortunately an instrument without any effective means of enforce-
ment.49 It is a non-binding agreement, and breaches do not carry any direct 
consequences.50 For example, despite having withdrawn its initial objection to 
the moratorium in 1987, Japan has continued to issue research permits that 
permit the killing of hundreds of whales each year with no repercussions for 
their actions.51 
Considering that the whaling activities primarily take place off the coast 
of Antarctica in the Southern Ocean, and that the ships involved in whaling 
and whaling related conflicts are based out of Australia and Japan it is unlikely 
that the laws of the United States would be applicable.52 Rather, Japanese or 
Australian laws would likely be the default and it is unlikely that either of the 
two parties would subject itself to the other’s domestic laws.53 Furthermore, 
even if an American court did have jurisdiction in a suit seeking to enforce the 
ICRW, it is unlikely that it would attempt to compel enforcement of a ruling 
against a country such as Japan.54 Such action would at best sour diplomatic 
                                                                                                                           
 48 The International Whaling Commission, supra note 39; see ICRW, supra note 38, at art. IV, ¶ 
1, art. VI. 
 49 See Japanese Whaling Company Found Guilty of “Willful Contempt,” Fined $1 Million AUS in 
Court Case by Humane Society International, HUMANE SOC’Y INT’L (Nov. 18, 2015) [hereinafter 
Japanese Whaling Company Found Guilty], http://www.hsi.org/news/press_releases/2015/11/hsi-
australia-wins-case-against-japanese-whaling-company-111815.html [https://perma.cc/7TEW-DETF] 
(noting a recent fine levied against Japan for its defiance of an International Court of Justice ruling 
and Japan’s plan to continue to defy the ruling). See generally Lauren Brooks, Comment, The Interna-
tional Whaling Commission: All Bark, No Bite, ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y (Aug. 23, 2010), http://
www.ajelp.com/comments/the-international-whaling-commission-all-bark-no-bite/ [https://perma.
cc/7NHJ-P52K] (criticizing the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling and the Inter-
national Whaling Commission and stating that they have not fulfilled their original objectives, “coop-
eration and sacrifice”). 
 50 The Whales’ Navy, SEA SHEPHERD, http://www.seashepherd.org/whales [https://perma.cc/
GJ7U-SASW]. 
 51 Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y (Sea Shepherd I), 860 F. Supp. 
2d 1216, 1220–21 (W.D. Wash. 2012), rev’d, 708 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2013), amended and supersed-
ed by 725 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2013) (describing how in 2012 alone, the permits allowed for a total of 
over a thousand whales of varying species to be slaughtered for research purposes). 
 52 Id. at 1236–37; (discussing generally how the inability of a U.S. court to rule under admiralty 
law in this situation is significant because so far, admiralty law is the only law that either the Institute 
for Cetacean Research (“ICR”) or Sea Shepherd has obeyed). 
 53 Id. The court reasoned, by applying the factors established in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 
571, 578 (1953), that because the parties claiming injury were Japanese citizens and defendants base 
of operations is Australia, that Japan and Australia would be the most appropriate forums for dispute. 
Id. 
 54 Id. 
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relations between the two countries, and at worst could be taken as a hostile 
act, resulting in an international incident.55 
B. United Nations Treaties 
1. World Charter for Nature 
The Sea Shepherd Conservation Society (“Sea Shepherd”) relies on para-
graph 21 of the World Charter for Nature as the basis for its authority to act in 
furtherance of international conservation law.56 Paragraph 21 of the World 
Charter for Nature provides that in addition to States: 
International organizations, individuals, groups and corporations 
shall: (a) co-operate in the task of conserving nature through com-
mon activities and other relevant actions, including information ex-
change and consultations; (b) establish standards for products and 
manufacturing processes that may have adverse effects on nature, as 
well as agreed methodologies for assessing these effects; (c) imple-
ment the applicable international legal provisions for the conserva-
tion of nature and the protection of the environment; (d) ensure that 
activities within their jurisdictions or control do not cause image to 
the nature systems located within other States or in the areas beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction; (e) safeguard and conserve nature 
in areas beyond national jurisdiction.57 
Essentially, paragraph 21 empowers any individual or non-governmental or-
ganization (NGO) to enforce international conservation law in places outside 
the scope of national jurisdiction.58 
2. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) is a 
sweeping international agreement created to establish an equitable legal order 
for the seas.59 UNCLOS covers a great number of topics, ranging from an ex-
plicit prohibition of slavery, to seizure of a pirate ship.60 To date, 167 nations 
                                                                                                                           
 55 Id.; Ali Moore, Court Rules Against Japan’s Whale Hunt, AUSTL. BROAD. CORP. (Jan. 15, 
2008), http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2007/s2139165.htm [https://perma.cc/MP6P-CDX5] (con-
tending that attempts by Australia to enforce an injunction against Japan would result in a “diplomatic 
headache with a vital trading partner.”)  
 56 G.A. Res. 37/7, ¶ 21 (Oct. 28, 1982) [hereinafter World Charter for Nature]; Mandate, SEA 
SHEPHERD, http://www.seashepherd.org/who-we-are/mandate.html [https://perma.cc/RT8L-A4UA]. 
 57 World Charter for Nature, supra note 56, at ¶ 21. 
 58 See id.; see also Mandate, supra note 56. 
 59 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 101, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397; 
Sea Shepherd I, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 1233. 
 60 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 59, at art. 101. 
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have ratified the agreement, including the United States, Australia, and Ja-
pan.61 
3. COLREGS 
The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 
(“COLREGS”) are a set of navigational rules designed to prevent collisions 
between vessels.62 Published by the International Marine Organization, a spe-
cialized agency of the United Nations, the COLREGS were adopted as a con-
vention in 1972.63 In essence, they are a detailed compilation of the established 
rules for maritime traffic, agreed to by hundreds of countries including the 
United States and Japan.64 
C. United States Law 
1. Alien Tort Statute 
Under what is commonly known as the Alien Tort Statute, a United States 
federal court may possess “original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien 
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States.”65 In essence, the Alien Tort Statute grants foreign citizens the 
ability to file suit in U.S. courts for violations of international law that oc-
curred outside the jurisdictional borders of the United States.66 
2. SUA 
Ratified by the United States in 1994, the Convention for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (“SUA”) sought 
to address concerns about unlawful acts that threatened the safety of ships and 
the security of their passengers and crews.67 Introduced at the Fourteenth Ses-
sion of the International Marine Organization in 1985, SUA prohibits a series 
                                                                                                                           
 61 Chronological Lists of Ratifications, Accessions and Successions to the Convention and the 
Related Agreements, U.N. DIV. FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, http://www.un.
org/depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm [https://perma.cc/D4TD-69F4]. 
 62 See Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea pmbl., Jul. 
15, 1977, 28 U.S.T. 3459, 1050 U.N.T.S. 16. 
 63 Id.; Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 
(COLREGs), INT’L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/
Pages/COLREG.aspx [https://perma.cc/8HLV-CCRN]. 
 64 See Sea Shepherd I, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 1235 (quoting Crowley Marine Servs. v. Maritrans, Inc. 
530 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
 65 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (noting that admiralty jurisdiction extends to torts on the high seas 
that arise out of traditional maritime activity). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 
pmbl., Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter SUA]. 
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of acts that endanger the safe navigation of a ship.68 Specifically, SUA prohib-
its acts of violence against shipboard individuals, damaging a ship or its cargo, 
or placing anything on a ship that would likely damage the ship.69 
III. GLOBAL ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 
A. The Sea Shepherd Conservation Society 
In 1975, having gained experience on a number of missions designed to 
stop nuclear testing at the Mururoa Atoll in the South Pacific, Captain Paul 
Watson, a Sierra Club Member and one of the founders of the Greenpeace 
Foundation, experienced a life-changing event—he served as first officer in a 
mission to disrupt a Soviet whaling expedition.70 In this role, he piloted a small 
inflatable boat directly into the line of fire, positioning the boat between a har-
poon vessel and a fleet of sperm whales.71 While he was between the harpoon 
and the whales, a harpooned whale leapt out of the water and Watson claims to 
have witnessed a flicker of understanding in the whale’s eye, recognizing that 
Watson’s boat was attempting to save the whale.72 From then on Watson swore 
a vow to become a lifelong defender of whales and all sea creatures.73 Two 
years and many similar missions later, Watson left the Greenpeace Foundation 
and founded The Sea Shepherd Conservation Society (“Sea Shepherd”) in 
1977.74 
Sea Shepherd was formed to protect marine ecosystems and species by 
ending the slaughter of marine wildlife and the destruction of their habitats.75 
Officially, Sea Shepherd’s primary mandate is to serve as a form of law en-
forcement for the United Nations World Charter for Nature.76 Sea Shepherd 
uses a fleet composed of three ships for its anti-whaling missions.77 The BOB 
BARKER and the STEVE IRWIN are both Dutch-flagged vessels about 160 
feet in length, and the BRIGITTE BARDOT is an Australian-flagged trimaran, 
                                                                                                                           
 68 SUA, supra note 67, at art. 3(1); Sea Shepherd I, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 1233. 
 69 SUA, supra note 67, at art. 3(1)(b)–(d); Sea Shepherd I, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 1233. 
 70 Captain Paul Watson’s Biography, SEA SHEPHERD CONSERVATION SOC’Y, 
http://www.seashepherd.org/who-we-are/captain-paul-watson-s-biography.html 
[https://perma.cc/NWV4-3NVF]. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. Watson reportedly left over a dispute relating to tactics. Id. 
 75 See Who We Are, SEA SHEPHERD AUSTL., http://www.seashepherd.org.au/who-we-are/about-
us/who-we-are.html [https://perma.cc/8M68-CSTZ]. 
 76 Mandate, supra note 56; see World Charter for Nature, supra note 56, at ¶ 21. 
 77 Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y (Sea Shepherd I), 860 F. Supp. 
2d 1216, 1222 (W.D. Wash. 2012), rev’d, 708 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2013), amended and superseded by 
725 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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roughly 100 feet in length.78 The ships also have support from a number of 
small rigid inflatable boats, called zodiacs, which are launched from the larger 
ships.79 
Having conducted over two hundred missions to further its goals, Sea 
Shepherd uses direct action tactics to expose and confront illegal activities on 
the world’s oceans.80 One tactic often used in anti-whaling missions involves 
throwing glass bottles filled with paint or butyric acid at the whaling ships.81 
When the bottles smash on the boat deck, they ruin the whale meat aboard the 
ships, and the butyric acid creates a foul odor on the deck that is unbearable for 
the whaling crew.82 Other tactics include the towing of lines in front of the 
whaling ships with the goal of fouling the propeller, hurling smoke bombs, 
using of a high-powered laser, and piloting the fleet to collide with the whaling 
vessels.83 As of 2012, there was no evidence of any injury to whaling crews as 
a result of these tactics.84 
In 2012, the Institute for Cetacean Research (“ICR”) brought an action 
against the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society in the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Washington, alleging violations of its right to 
free navigation at sea and piracy.85 To remedy these alleged violations, the ICR 
sought to enjoin Sea Shepherd from coming within 800 meters of their ves-
sels.86 
Regarding the piracy claim, the district court adopted the view used in 
United States v. Hasan, which is consistent with the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”).87 Under this view, piracy encom-
passes any illegal act of violence, or illegal act of detention, committed against 
a ship or persons aboard that ship for private ends while at sea.88 The court 
held that the lack of private ends sought by Sea Shepherd, as well as the lack 
of violence in their methods, precluded any finding of piracy.89 
In its analysis of the safe navigation claim, the court utilized 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2280, which codifies the United States’ ratification of Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 
                                                                                                                           
 78 Id. 
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 87 Sea Shepherd I, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 1232; United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 640 
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(“SUA”).90 Applying the provisions of SUA to the actions of Sea Shepherd, the 
court found that only two of Sea Shepherd’s tactics could be considered as 
possible violations.91 First, the court found there to be only one instance of Sea 
Shepherd successfully fouling a propeller by dragging lines in front of a whal-
ing vessel, and that there was no evidence that this tactic disabled the ship, 
even temporarily.92 Therefore, it could not reach the conclusion that this tactic 
endangered the safe navigation of a ship, and consequently was not in violation 
of SUA.93 
Concerning Sea Shepherd’s tactic of maneuvering in close proximity to 
the whaling vessels and making collision likely, the district court found the 
whalers’ SUA claim lacking.94 In the one documented occurrence of an actual 
collision between Sea Shepherd and a whaling vessel, there was no evidence 
that the incident endangered the safe navigation of the whaling ship, nor was 
there evidence of any damage to the whaling ship itself.95 The court did find, 
however, that these tactics are likely violations of the International Regulations 
for Preventing Collisions at Sea (“COLREGS”), which includes provisions 
mandating actions to avoid collisions.96 The court ultimately stated, though, 
that while they found Sea Shepherd’s tactics to be troubling it was beyond the 
power of the court to issue the injunction.97 
In 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed 
the decision of the lower court.98 The Ninth Circuit found that Sea Shepherd 
had indeed engaged in piracy, that the ICR was likely to succeed on the merits 
of its claim that Sea Shepherd violated SUA, the whalers were likely to suffer 
irreparable harm in absence of a preliminary injunction, the balance of equities 
and public interest favored enjoining Sea Shepard’s activities, and the doctrine 
of unclean hands did not preclude issuance of an injunction.99 Accordingly, the 
Ninth Circuit granted the ICR’s request for a preliminary injunction against 
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Sea Shepherd, requiring that it stay at least 800 meters from ICR vessels and 
prohibiting attacks on its crewmembers or its ships.100 
Pursuant to this ruling, Sea Shepherd has declared on its website that it no 
longer actively participates in protecting whales in the Southern Ocean from 
hunters.101 A separate organization, Sea Shepherd Australia Limited, now op-
erates in its stead in the fight against unauthorized whaling.102 Refusing to ac-
cept donations for Sea Shepherd Australia Limited, or to support it in any way, 
Sea Shepherd seeks to evade any attempts to link the two organizations by any 
means except name, organizational and tactical structure, and mission state-
ment.103 Therefore, because the 2012 injunction only applies to Sea Shepherd 
Conservation Society, Sea Shepherd Australia Limited, an Australian organiza-
tion incorporated in 2007, is presumably unaffected by the ruling.104 
Although admiralty jurisdiction extends to torts at sea that arise out of 
traditional maritime activity it does not extend to acts, such as whaling, that are 
not considered torts.105 Therefore, in Institute of Cetacean Research v. Sea 
Shepherd Conservation Society (Sea Shepherd I), the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Washington was able to claim jurisdiction 
because the suit concerned allegations of tortious behavior by Sea Shepherd.106 
The same court, however, would not be able to hear a suit seeking to enforce 
the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (“ICRW”) against 
Japan without an underlying tort claim.107 
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B. Australian Whale Sanctuary 
Australia attempted to curb the extent of Japan’s whaling by creating the 
Australian Whale Sanctuary (“AWS”) in 1999.108 Created under the Environ-
ment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act, this sanctuary extends 
from the state waters limit to the boundary of the Exclusive Economic Zone, 
an area that begins at three nautical miles offshore and extends to approximate-
ly 200 nautical miles, around Australia and its external islands.109 Additionally, 
the sanctuary extends for 200 nautical miles off the coast of Australia’s disput-
ed Antarctic territory, and prohibits killing, injuring, or interference with a ce-
tacean.110 Due to the disputed nature of the Antarctic territory, only the United 
Kingdom, France, Norway, and New Zealand recognize the Antarctic portion 
of the AWS.111 
Despite Japan’s lack of recognition of the Antarctic AWS, the Humane 
Society International brought suit against the ICR under Australian law.112 The 
ICR refused to participate in the proceedings, and Australia’s Federal Court 
subsequently granted a permanent injunction against the ICR in 2008, enjoin-
ing it from hunting and killing whales in the AWS.113 Nevertheless, the ICR 
has continued to whale in defiance of the injunction despite another ruling by 
the Australian Federal Court against it in 2015.114 
C. International Court of Justice Ruling 
Australia filed an application for proceedings against Japan in the Regis-
try of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) in May of 2010.115 These pro-
ceedings were pursuant to Japan’s continued large-scale commercial whaling 
program, the Japanese Whale Research Program under Special Permit in the 
Antarctic (“JARPA II”).116 Australia alleged that JARPA II violated the obliga-
tions that Japan assumes as a current signatory of the ICRW.117 Specifically, 
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Australia alleged that Japan breached its obligations to abide by both the zero 
catch limit for commercial whaling, and the moratorium on the taking, killing, 
or treating of non-minke whales by factory ships.118 In response, Japan assert-
ed that the special permits it issues for its whaling activities are lawful under 
the scientific research exemption of the ICRW. 
In March 2014, the ICJ ruled that the scale of JARPA II, Japan’s whaling 
program, was not justified on scientific research grounds and accordingly, 
JARPA II breached Article VIII of the ICRW.119 Article VIII allows for coun-
tries to grant special permits for whaling that is done for the purposes of scien-
tific research.120 In not meeting this exception, Japan’s whaling activities did 
not conform to the various obligations under the ICRW including the morato-
riums on commercial whaling, factory ship use, and whaling in the Southern 
Ocean Sanctuary.121 Consequently, the ICJ ordered Japan to cease from insti-
tuting any whaling permit programs that are not related to scientific research 
under Article VIII, to terminate the operations of JARPA II, and to revoke li-
censes or permits that it had already granted pursuant to JARPA II.122 Follow-
ing the ICJ ruling, the government of Japan announced plans for a new re-
search program entitled the New Scientific Whale Research Program in the 
Antarctic Ocean.123 This new program continues to target the Southern Ocean 
as the focal point for its research activities.124 The program intends to target 
3996 whales over a twelve-year period, and thus constitutes a departure from 
its previous allocations, which permitted the killing of over 1000 whales each 
year.125 
On the inter-governmental level, it falls on the United Nations Security 
Council to enforce rulings by the ICJ, and so far, the Security Council has yet 
to enforce the 2014 ruling against Japan.126 The Security Council is comprised 
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of fifteen member-states, and requires a nine-vote majority in order to pass a 
resolution.127 In order for the Security Council to take action, it must determine 
the existence of a threat to the peace or an act of aggression, and typically ac-
tions are in response to major events such as terrorist threats or the prolifera-
tion of weapons of mass destruction.128 So, a continued whaling campaign in 
the face of an ICJ ruling is unlikely to provoke the ire of a majority of mem-
bers in the face of more pressing international affairs.129 Further, many mem-
bers of the Security Council would likely not want to run the risk of jeopardiz-
ing relations with Japan—a member of the G7 that boasts the fourth highest 
gross domestic product in the world.130 
IV. NGOS AS A TOOL WHERE TRADITIONAL ENFORCEMENT HAS FAILED 
Whaling is inherently an international issue.131 Unbound by the laws and 
borders of nations, whales are a resource shared by all, and the impact of an 
irreversible decline in stock would be far-reaching.132 Accordingly, as is com-
mon when it comes to international natural resource management, the laws of 
just one nation are not adequate to govern the culling of whales; whale stock 
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can only be managed through cooperative international efforts and compli-
ance.133 
A. Independent Enforcement 
Given the inherent difficulties that sovereign nations and inter-
governmental organizations face in enforcing international whaling treaties, an 
alternative enforcer that would likely be more effective is a non-governmental 
organization (NGO).134 With the ability to function free of any national or po-
litical affiliations, NGOs are able to operate in the international arena unhin-
dered by secondary considerations.135 With funding coming only from private 
parties, an NGO can use any means it sees fit, in accordance with international 
law, to complete its primary objective.136 The Sea Shepherd Conservation So-
ciety (“Sea Shepherd”), for instance, operates solely on private donations with 
the assistance of volunteers; it is not state-funded, and does not claim to repre-
sent the interests of any one nation in particular.137 
The enforcement of law by non-governmental entities is an increasing 
global trend.138 From the Pinkerton railroad bruisers of the late nineteenth cen-
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tury American West to the modern day South African private security compa-
nies, private police forces have grown to fill the gaps left by conventional pub-
lic police.139 In particular, these private security companies offer services rang-
ing from merely patrolling designated areas, to, in the case of the Pinkertons, 
breaking strikes and keeping workers aligned with corporate interests.140 Invar-
iably, a core objective of private security companies the world over appears to 
be that of deterrence.141 Having a physically imposing and highly visible pres-
ence allows security companies to avoid both legal trouble and physical dan-
ger.142 
Although the private security sector is no stranger to controversy and po-
litical polemics, there is widespread demand for the service.143 Instead of at-
tempting to go against the tide of public demand for increased safety, interna-
tional entities such as the United Nations Human Rights Council and the Inter-
national Maritime Organization (“IMO”) have sought to regulate private secu-
rity in various ways.144 In particular, the IMO endorses the use of private secu-
rity companies on ships, but also encourages intensive vetting, selection, and 
training of individual contractors.145 Following the spread of private security 
contractors aboard ships in 2009, hijackings by pirates off the coast of Somalia 
has plummeted from dozens each year to just fifteen in 2013, and eleven in 
2014.146 Because of their efficacy and prevalence, one private contractor has 
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framed the issue of piracy as mostly one of private security, rather than a mili-
tary issue.147 
B. NGOs in the Environmental Context 
More analogous to the situation at hand, NGOs have demonstrated their 
effectiveness when national and international laws are impotent.148 In 2003, 
and then also in 2005, the government of Uruguay sanctioned the construction 
of two pulp paper mills near the city of Fray Bentos, Uruguay.149 The locations 
of both mills along the Uruguay River portended great detriment to the envi-
ronment and nearby ecosystems that Uruguay shares with Argentina.150 Ac-
cordingly, the Argentinian government filed suit in the International Court of 
Justice claiming the planned locations violated the 1975 Statute of the River 
Uruguay.151 Argentina requested the grant of a preliminary injunction enjoining 
the construction of the mills until a decision was reached, but its request was 
denied.152 
In conjunction with large-scale roadblocks and protests, an NGO, the 
Center for Human Rights and Environment (“CEDHA”) filed persistent litiga-
tion against the financiers of the two mills, mainly Equator Principle Compli-
ance Complaints.153 Although not hard-hitting, these complaints essentially 
served to shame the financial institutions into compliance out of fear of diplo-
matic retribution and international pressure.154 Combined, these tactics brought 
construction of the mills to a halt.155 Following years of ensuing conflict, the 
countries were ultimately able to reach an agreement that allowed the construc-
tion of the mills while drastically mitigating the initial projected environmental 
impact, and creating a binational commission to monitor pollution.156 
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Another field of environmental protection in which NGOs have played a 
major role is in the Danube Delta, a critical portion of the Danube River Basin 
and the largest wetland in Europe.157 In 2004, in order to gain access to the 
Black Sea for shipping and trade purposes, the Ukrainian government began 
constructing the Danube-Black Sea Canal.158 Conducting the planning phase of 
the operation in secret, the Ukrainian government eschewed public input and 
expedited the process to avoid any external obstructions.159 Although it was 
economically lucrative, the environmental impact was incalculable.160 Though 
broad in scope, the primary danger of the plan was the loss of biodiversity in 
the region.161 The loss of biodiversity would not only affect Ukrainian territo-
ries, but also numerous other countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa.162 Other 
negative impacts included pollution from the dredging and shipping, lower 
water levels in surrounding wetlands, and economic losses to the local fishing 
industry.163 
In opposition to the continued construction of the Canal, Ecopravo-Lviv 
(“EPL”), an NGO, filed complaints against the Ukrainian government under 
the Espoo Convention, the Aarhus Convention, the Danube River Protection 
Convention, and the Bonn Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Spe-
cies.164 The Espoo Convention is particularly relevant, as it seeks to “prevent, 
reduce, and control significant adverse transboundary environmental impacts 
from proposed activities.”165 This convention requires that parties conduct an 
environmental impact assessment (“EIA”) prior to commencing any project 
likely to have an adverse transboundary impact.166 Additionally, it requires par-
ties to allow members of the public who will be affected to participate in the 
EIA, and to submit EIA documentation to all parties who will be affected.167 
EPL alleged in its complaint that Ukraine failed to abide by these, and other, 
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requirements, failing to consult with affected parties concerning the trans-
boundary environmental impacts.168 Unfortunately, despite the timely filing of 
its complaint, the Implementation Committee of the Espoo Convention was 
unable to consider EPL’s complaint because to procedural prohibitions against 
hearing complaints brought by NGOs.169 
Although Romania filed similar complaints against Ukraine regarding the 
environmental impact of the Canal, they did not do so until after construction 
on the Canal began.170 Although Romania, as a nation-state, has the requisite 
standing to file a complaint under the Espoo Convention, the EPL was better 
informed of the situation and therefore in a better position to contest the ca-
nal.171 Additionally, EPL lacks the bureaucratic hurdles that the Romanian 
government must jump over in order to take action, and are therefore better 
suited to file these kinds of complaints.172 
Perhaps the most direct analogs to Sea Shepherd are outfits like the Inter-
national Anti-Poaching Foundation (“IAPF”). Formed in 2009, the IAPF is a 
nonprofit organization registered in Australia, South Africa, the United States, 
and Zimbabwe that strives to protect endangered wildlife.173 The foundation 
focuses on protecting “high-target” animals—such as elephants and rhinos—
that are targeted by increasingly sophisticated poachers.174 There has been a 
sharp upsurge in poaching in the past two decades.175 Sources such as the 
World Wildlife Fund believe the reason for this increase in demand is a result 
of a growing middle class in Vietnam that not only sees rhino horn as a status 
symbol, but also as a panacea of sorts, imbued with mythical properties that 
can cure cancer, heart conditions, and even hangovers.176 
Although Zimbabwe has anti-poaching rangers of its own, they are not a 
focal point of the current government.177 The Zimbabwean government is still 
recovering from a recent financial collapse, and economic sanctions from both 
the United States and the United Nations have stymied government funding of 
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the wildlife sector.178 Consequently, this instability left a void that created a 
valuable opportunity for poachers to hunt in some of the country’s best preser-
vations with relatively little opposition.179 
Due to strained diplomatic relations between the United States and the 
United Nations and Zimbabwe, as well as little governmental funding, Zimba-
bwe’s best hope for preserving its endangered big-game has proven to be an 
NGO.180 The IAPF provides direct action to combat poaching, conservation 
security plans, wildlife crime information systems, and ranger training.181 Alt-
hough Zimbabwe has a shoot-on-site policy in place for armed poachers, the 
IAPF trains its rangers in the proper use of force—the minimum force neces-
sary to deter and capture poachers.182 At its main area of operations, the Stan-
ley & Livingstone Private Game Preserve, no black rhinos under the guard of 
the IAPF have been killed since 2010.183 By contrast, the closest population of 
black rhinos in Hwange National Park, roughly one hundred kilometers away, 
has dwindled from 176 down to only a few in essentially the same time span 
due to poaching.184 
C. United States Recognition of NGOs 
 Although it may be argued that the above examples highlight only en-
forcement powers granted by struggling national governments, the United 
States Congress recently passed a bill advocating for independent enforcement 
powers to protect wildlife on an international level.185 The Global Anti-
Poaching Act (“GAPA”), introduced in May 2015 by Representative Edward 
R. Royce of California and enacted into law in October 2016, primarily en-
deavors to ease the process of prosecuting wildlife trafficking cases and in-
crease the accompanying penalties for poaching.186 Additionally, the bill pro-
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vides further resources and tools to aid the fight against this global crisis.187 
Most relevant to the issue at hand is Title IV of GAPA, which promotes sup-
porting the professionalization of the wildlife enforcement sector.188 By 
providing greater resources for enforcement of wildlife laws, the United States 
is, in effect, recognizing the unique efficacy of combined governmental and 
non-governmental efforts.189  
V. USING NGOS TO ENFORCE INTERNATIONAL WHALING REGULATIONS 
In order for Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) enforcement to truly 
be effective, the International Whaling Commission (“IWC”) needs to amend 
the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (“ICRW”) to add a 
provision comparable to paragraph 21 of the United Nations World Charter for 
Nature, which allows for enforcement of international environmental legal pro-
tections by NGOs, and even other private actors.190 Explicitly providing for 
enforcement by a specified class of NGOs, such an amendment would circum-
vent the various procedural and diplomatic hurdles preventing the United Na-
tions Security Council from compelling Japan to obey the International Court 
of Justice ruling.191 Additionally, further legitimizing the enforcement role cur-
rently filled by the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society (“Sea Shepherd”) may 
give rise to parallel organizations, increasing the efficacy of its mission and 
easing the financial burden they shoulder.192 
Given the potentially dangerous nature of Sea Shepherd’s tactics this 
amendment would need to contain safety provisions to make it palatable to the 
members of the IWC.193 Such provisions would need to specify what types of 
tactics are allowable, and those that are inordinately dangerous would need to 
be expressly prohibited.194 Legitimizing certain tactics while outlawing others 
would likely result in Sea Shepherd using safer tactics.195 
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Although some may argue that providing an NGO such as Sea Shepherd 
with the legal ammunition necessary to continue its operations endangers the 
lives of whalers, in reality, it protects them.196 By legitimizing NGO enforce-
ment of the whaling moratorium, the ICRW can regulate a class of actors that 
will presumably continue to operate regardless of any legal backing.197 The 
proposed amendment can prohibit enforcement until whalers have reached a 
newly determined, small quota backed by independent research that allows for 
the culling of a small number of whales per year.198 After reaching this point, 
whalers would need to cease operations or deal with the enforcing NGO.199 
Such a provision would protect whalers from the NGOs while gathering the 
allowable number of whales for legitimate research purposes, thereby prevent-
ing an environmentally dangerous level of commercial slaughter.200 
Additionally, legitimizing the operations of Sea Shepherd could introduce 
an increased level of accountability into its operations.201 With the rising influ-
ence and power of NGOs over the past few decades, the issue of their account-
ability has been illuminated.202 As some proponents have articulated, the mis-
sions and objectives of NGOs are rarely, if ever, reflective of a broad societal 
acceptance, rather they are a subjective stance on what is right, and what is 
wrong. 203 Accordingly, for the legitimization of an NGO by an international 
body such as the United Nations to be widely accepted, certain measures must 
be introduced to compel some level of accountability in exchange for increased 
power.204 
Indeed, a formal structure allowing for NGOs to engage with the United 
Nations is already in place.205 Article 71 of the United Nations Charter grants 
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NGOs consultative status with the U.N. Economic and Social Council 
(“ECOSOC”), allowing ECOSOC to obtain advice or information from NGOs 
that have specific expertise in relevant fields.206 Indeed, the role of NGOs in 
the international arena is increasing.207 It is likely that this increase is a result 
of several factors, including the ability of an NGO to specialize in a narrow 
field and develop a deep expertise, their typical close proximity to the issue 
and the people most effected by that issue, and largely the growth of interna-
tional law itself, necessitating special committees and organizations that inher-
ently cannot be controlled by one nation.208 Accordingly, there is precedent for 
NGO engagement in United Nations affairs, and depending on the nature of its 
provisions, an amendment to the ICRW granting enforcement power to certain 
NGOs would hopefully not experience substantial opposition.209 
If such an amendment did experience substantial opposition, it would 
most likely be the result of fears that empowered NGOs could undermine state 
sovereignty.210 Although allowing NGOs the limited ability to enforce interna-
tional law could be seen as infringing on the sovereignty of nations, it would 
not be much more of an infringement than existing, widely accepted interna-
tional regulations.211 The imposition of international environmental laws, in 
particular those pertaining to the prevention of transboundary harm, have al-
ready eroded the idea that nations can be completely independent actors, free 
of responsibility to other nations.212 
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The strongest opponent of such an amendment would undoubtedly be Ja-
pan.213 Openly defying a ruling by the International Court of Justice and con-
tinuing their whaling campaign into the 2015–2016 season, Japan has made 
clear their stance on the matter.214 In order to oppose an amendment to the 
ICRW, Japan would need to file an objection to said amendment within ninety-
days of notification by the commission.215 If they do this successfully, then the 
effective date of the amendment is postponed to all contracting governments 
for ninety days.216After this second period, the amendment becomes effective 
to all contracting governments except any that objected, and does not become 
effective to these latter governments until they withdraw their objection.217 
Therefore, although Japan could theoretically maintain their objection to this 
amendment indefinitely, the eighty-eight other contracting nations will be noti-
fied of their objection.218 Accordingly, international pressure on Japan to either 
cease their whaling campaign or withdraw their objection would increase, as 
Japan would be defying not only a widely accepted amendment, but also the 
ICRW itself, in addition to the International Court of Justice.219 As an NGO 
such as Sea Shepherd Australia would be the body enforcing the ICRW, no 
sovereign nation in particular would need to jeopardize relations with Japan in 
order for the amendment to have teeth.220 Finally, with whale oil no longer 
needed for household purposes, whale meat no longer a staple protein of the 
Japanese diet, and increasing diplomatic friction with the international com-
munity over the matter, a cost-benefit analysis of continuing to whale certainly 
weighs against it.221 
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CONCLUSION 
 Following technological innovation in the early 1900s, the hunting of 
whales reached a breaking point after which the depleted stock required inter-
national attention. Although whaling nations reached an agreement culminat-
ing in a global moratorium on commercial whaling, the exceptions that were 
carved out continue to give rise to problems today. Although these problems 
are international in nature, inter-governmental regulation has proven insuffi-
cient as a means of enforcement, and national jurisdictions do not extend to 
whaling grounds. For these reasons, an amendment to the ICRW authorizing 
independent enforcement of the moratorium on commercial whaling is neces-
sary for it to be truly effective. 
